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I do not believe in natural law. As a result, I find neither comfort nor
security in the proposition that the human rights principles we are now
developing or reinforcing are something "natural" and hence inevitable
because they are inherent in our nature or in the very nature of law. Nor
do I believe that the human rights program in this century has very deep
roots in human history or, for that matter, very deep roots in contemporary
politics. It is a recent development, arising from a unique conjunction of
factors including the deterioration of the prevailing political and social
order in Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the rise of
industrialization, the increasing complexity of class structure in Western
Europe, and some religious innovations that fortuitously played into these
other trends. One should be wary of assuming that human rights is the
unfolding of something inherent and will inexorably continue whether or
not political leaders and those who act as temporary custodians of this
program make grievous errors. The stakes are high and the game could be
lost.
The distinctive prescriptions and institutional arrangements for invo-
cation and application of the human rights program were developed after
World War II. Initially, they were attempts to establish a set of standards to
test and restrain the exercise of power of those governing against those
governed. Prior to that time, the general assumption had been that, short
of certain excesses, what a government did to its own people was, for the
most part, its own business. In 1942, for example, a member of the British
House of Commons characterized Adolph Hitler's treatment of Jews of
Allied nationality as a matter of international concern but characterized the
treatment of Jews of Axis nationality as no one else's business; it was a
domestic matter.' Since 1945, that conception has, for the most part,
changed. The basic proposition of the contemporary international law of
human rights is that a government may no longer do anything simply
because it is effective and promises to achieve its purpose or enhance its
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power vis-A-vis its own population as long as it is doing it only to its citizens
and in its own territory. In order to qualify for the name of government, a
government now has to meet certain standards, all of which involve
restraints on the use of power: no torture, no brutalization; no seizure of
property; no state terror; no discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or
sex; no prevention of people leaving a particular country, and so on.
The inception of the human rights program was a unique moment in
history, for the very elites that participated in this lawmaking process were
limiting some of their own future options by establishing a set of criteria
under which they could henceforth be criticized by enlightened world
opinion in terms of common legal symbols. At the legislative or prescriptive
level, the post-World War II experiment was largely successful. A number
of basic principles were firmly established. Civilized human beings in earlier
times might have looked at barbaric practices beyond their own boundaries
with feelings ranging from regret to horror; there was also the conviction
that those acts were beyond legal sanction. It is now normal to look at such
practices as violations of human rights and to insist upon official or
unofficial punitive and remedial action.
Because the lawmaking function of the human rights program has
been successful, attempts have been made periodically to transfer the
positive and now-accepted symbols from the core of prohibited acts to a
wider set of undesirable practices. Not all of these attempts have been
aimed at improving human rights. In 1978, I was present in Manila when
Ferdinand Marcos spoke to the International Law Association (ILA). He
was, he assured us, completely in favor of a very, very broad conception of
human rights. But the question of violation of human rights, he explained,
was always a matter of domestic concern and could not be reviewed by the
international community. Marcos' theory would have undone much that
had been accomplished since the end of World War II. It was resoundingly
rejected by the ILA.
About the same time, a number of other governments sought to
introduce a regional notion into human rights. Again the argument was
disarmingly simple: There is, of course, a general universal standard, but
one also ought to take account of regional and specialized cultural practices.
Now we can be sure that those who were trying to establish a regional
standard were not doing it because they wanted something higher than the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. What they were trying to do was
to carve out a geographical exemption. It too has been largely rejected.
Another effort was made to limit the operation of the norms that had
been established by insisting that countries involved in efforts at rapid
development of social and economic processes should be entitled to
suspend or, on a longer term basis, "defer" certain human rights. This, too,
won a certain amount of political and intellectual support, which is
puzzling; the alleged causal relationship between torture and economic
development is, to say the least, obscure. If this d6marche had succeeded, it
effectively would have eviscerated the international human rights program,
for 120 of the 160 states now in the United Nations can validly say they are
involved in development. That number includes few human rights para-
dises.
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It has been suggested in the last two years that the "right to peace"
should be viewed as a basic human right. It has been suggested as well that
the right to a clean environment should be installed as a basic human right.
If one takes the notion of man as the measure, then indeed, everything has
a human rights dimension-as a philosophical matter. But if we are talking
about a specialized program with limited resources, aimed at addressing a
particular pathology that has been characteristic of governments since the
beginning of recorded history, I submit that we undermine that program by
trying to extend it into areas beyond enforcement capacities, thereby
bleeding away both the anger at atrocities, the motive force we bring to the
program, and the very scarce resources we have for its implementation.
The international program for human rights will proceed best if it remains
fairly narrowly gauged, and if other social pathologies are treated in
different programs and not forced into this one.
For the same reason, it is not particularly useful to expend limited
resources for international human rights programs on American domestic
matters. In human rights discussions, it is exhilarating to strike our breasts
and say that we too are violators and should therefore be subject to the same
program. We should, of course, sign and ratify the treaties. But whether we
do or not, we are, in fact, in substantial compliance with them, which is
much more important and certainly better than the converse. In the United
States, domestic processes for remedying social iniquities are more accessi-
ble and effective than their shadowy international counterparts. We squan-
der our scarce international resources if we extend our conception of
international protection of human rights to matters that are appropriately
and effectively taken care of by our domestic institutions concerned with
civil liberties.
II
Two separate functions of the international human rights program are
frequently merged. One decision function is concerned with the establish-
ment of a general set of legal norms that are deemed to be of universal
application: "legislation," in domestic systems in which we have an orga-
nized entity called the Legislature, or "prescription," its functional equiva-
lent in unorganized systems. The other is the decision function of applica-
tion or implementation which takes these established general norms and
applies them to particular factual situations in which violations are al-
leged-identifying and making an appropriate characterization of the facts
in question, finding that there has been a violation and meting out
appropriate punishment, or, if necessary, appropriate compensation.
Human rights prescription, or lawmaking, has been rapid and extraor-
dinarily successful since the end of World War II. All sorts of behavior that
formerly would not have been considered as within the possible ambit of
law is now deemed, with scarcely a second thought, to be a violation of
international law. The accomplishment is all the more remarkable consid-
ering that the entities that played a major role in creating this law were
henceforth restricting their own freedom of action and holding themselves
up to a level of criticism that previously did not exist. But the application of
these general norms has proved a much more stubborn obstacle. The same
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governments that have been otiose in high-sounding statements about the
international law of human rights have been much more reserved in
making themselves available for something equivalent to compulsory
adjudication or even investigation, when they themselves might be viola-
tors.
The major problem for enlightened citizenry, in our country and
abroad, who care about and have the luxury of being able to do something
about human rights violations elsewhere, is the question of application. We
know what the human rights prescriptions are; we frequently know when
they are being violated; and we know something should be done. We look
desperately around for a competent court, for a public prosecutor or a
district attorney, and we find none. In these circumstances, we turn to our
own government and ask it to do something. When it resists-as it does, to
some extent, in every case in which we importune it-we then begin to
criticize the government or governments, in general, as being inherently
against human rights. And gradually our attention shifts from the actual
human rights malefactor to the "unindicted co-conspirator," our govern-
ment, which has not responded to our entreaties and hence must be a
collaborator in evil.
Sometimes we identify the culprits as our courts. Many international
lawyers experience a rapid escalation of blood pressure and tempers when
our courts refuse to take cases we think raise clear human rights issues.
Given our own commitment, it is hard to step back and ask whether these
courts have other functions and responsibilities whose discharge may
militate against active engagement in campaigns close to our own hearts. It
is to this matter and the moral and ethical problems it poses to citizen
activists that I would like to turn.
III
The absence of agencies and institutional arrangements for the
enforcement of law is the central problem in contemporary international
protection of human rights and in international law in general. We have
libraries full of international law, but it is very difficult to implement or
enforce it. It is easy enough to make matter-of-fact judgments about
violations of international law, but we can rarely proceed beyond that. The
problem is structural and almost insoluble at the international level, for at
that level, governments must establish enforcement institutions which will
operate against them and they are unwilling to do so.
One response of international lawyers to this structural problem was to
develop a notion of dddoublernentfonctionnel or "functional doubling," a term
coined by the great French professor, Georges Scelle.2 The idea had a
charming simplicity. We do not have an international court of general or
compulsory jurisdiction, but we do have domestic courts of general and
2. See generally Scelle, Le Phinom neJuridique du Dldoubekment Fonctionnel, in RECHTSFRAGEN
DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION (FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS WEHBERG) 324 (W. Schitzel & H.
Schlochauer ed. 1956).
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compulsory jurisdiction. Why not view domestic courts as functional
international courts?3 We do not have an international legislature with a
general or compulsory jurisdiction, but we do have domestic legislatures
with general and compulsory jurisdiction. Why not use those domestic
legislatures as functional international lawmakers? 4 A generation of schol-
ars discovered that it was possible, case by case, to gerry-rig different sorts
of domestic enforcement mechanisms in order to secure some implemen-
tation of international law issues. Human rights lawyers have been doing
the same thing. Rather than continuing to look vainly for an international
agency for the international protection of human rights, attention has
shifted to domestic legislatures and courts.
Functional doubling suggests certain possibilities for enforcement but
they are not infinite. Functional doubling depends on the elasticity of
institutions. But there is a limit to "institutional elasticity," i.e., the extent to
which institutions created and still used for other purposes can be
"stretched" in order to get them to perform human rights functions,
especially when those functions are accomplished at the expense of their
manifest functions. Institutions simply cannot do everything we think they
are capable of, if this requires them to move too far from their manifest
mandate.
Consider an example: A factory is an institutional arrangement
designed to increase production, reduce cost, and enhance both the wealth
of the community and the different factors of production engaged in it. A
factory is an almost quintessential profit-maximizer. Once you have estab-
lished a factory, you may be able to stretch it to perform a number of
nonwealth-producing functions. For example, it may be possible to get it to
discharge a variety of health functions, particularly if you can persuade
those who are in charge of it or are its beneficiaries that enhancing the
health of the workers is likely to contribute to the factory's overall utility. It
may be possible to persuade the managers to set up a creche so that mothers
with young children can continue to work. But there is a limit to elasticity.
There is a point at which stretching the factory to include sports, vacations,
and so on-all legitimate welfare functions-will begin to undermine the
factory's wealth-production function, which continues to be its raison d'etre
and the condition sine qua non of its existence. Then the factory, in
competition with others, goes bankrupt, or before that, the factory's
managers reject this functional doubling and revert to a narrower range of
activities. If you are still committed to having those welfare activities
performed, you must develop separate specialized institutions-govern-
ment agencies and so on-to perform them.
Consider another example. Because an embassy is "extraterritorial,"
embassies abroad could be extraordinarily valuable for human rights
purposes. The United States Embassy in Moscow is, metaphorically, not
Soviet, but American territory. Anyone who can reach the sanctuary of the
Embassy is outside Soviet jurisdiction. If you look at the various despotisms
about the globe, you may ask why we do not use our embassies in those
3. See id. at 339-40.
4. See id.
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countries as underground railroads. When people find themselves in peril
from a wicked regime, why not let them into our embassies and then slip
them out or negotiate them out? The practice is known as "diplomatic
asylum." From time to time, governments use it. There are, however, costs
involved with the use of diplomatic asylum. When a government has major
foreign policy concerns with another government, it may discover that
when it uses its embassy for this nonembassy function, it gets high marks
for human rights but minimizes its effectiveness with the host government.
Here again, there are limits to institutional elasticity.
We encounter the same limited elasticity when we seek to recruit our
own government as an enforcer or applier of international human rights
for clear cases of violation. The government official has a role that carries
a variety of obligations with different priorities. One of them may be to
enhance, insofar as possible, the human rights of citizens of other states.
But another obligation-possibly more exigent-may be to enhance rela-
tionships with the governments of other states on whom we may be
dependent for some important service. One does not have to look far for
examples. If one is locked into a global war system, as we unfortunately are,
it may be necessary to maintain bases abroad as a way of countering the
military reach or capabilities of an adversary. Important bases may have to
be maintained in the territories of egregious human rights violators.
The government official, who is animated by human rights concerns
and revolted by the human rights violations of another government, will
often find that the obligations of a governmental role do not permit taking
the same position that might have been taken were the incumbent still in
the private sphere. Unless we are willing to say that there are no security
problems abroad-that all talk of national security is the figment of a
paranoid's imagination, that one does not need military bases for there are
no countries that conspire to cultivate schemes that might involve or
undermine our position or that of our allies-we must try to understand
and sympathize with the human-rights-sensitive government official who
encounters a clear human rights violation but determines that other official
obligations prevent stretching or elasticizing to deal with the infraction.
The source of the conflict between human rights activists, operating
on the civic side, and the human-rights-sensitive government official,
operating on the governmental side, is not one of personal moral defect of
particular government officials. It is inherently structural. To be sure, some
administrations have more coherent, articulated human rights programs.
Rhetoric is important and not without consequence, for it may act, at least
in anticipatory fashion, as some sort of warning to despots. But if one totals
what was actually done at the end of a four- or eight-year period, the
differences between successive United States governments in this matter
are essentially superficial.
The point of this analysis is not that we should stop pressuring our
government when we think there are severe human rights violations
abroad. On the contrary. Political pressure is our role and responsibility and
our only base of power. There are cases and circumstances in which there
is no valid reason for a democratic government to refuse to respond actively
and publicly to human rights violations. But there are other cases in which
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we ought to be sensitive to the complexity of governmental objectives, and
to appreciate that the amount of favorable response and action we can
secure by popular pressure will be limited. When this happens, there is no
reason to wax furious at our government and to indict it as a collaborator
in the violation of human rights. Rather, we ought to look for alternative
methods of enforcement.
IV
But are there alternatives? And, equally important, are they within our
reach?
Sunshine can be a sterilizing agent. Things that have been permitted
to grow in the darkness should be exposed to the light. In a modern state
system, electronics link us all together. Nationally and internationally we
exist in a state of electronic simultaneity. Those who control the content of
the electronic channels characterize the events that are transmitted through
them: they choose which events to transmit and how often to transmit
them. They determine what editorial comments or what evaluations to
make of those events they transmit. I submit that the media in our system
and in systems in related industrial democracies can be recruited much
more effectively for human rights enforcement than they have been until
now. They are part of a competitive market and, as such, must respond to
consumer demands. Those in the media are insufficiently aware of the
human rights movement and, in particular, of the prescriptions or legisla-
tion that have been established. Insufficient pressure is brought on editors
and reporters to cover violations of international law because the violations
do not seem to be sufficiently glamorous or important. Rather than creating
a human rights institute in which we bring in lawyers for three or six
months of intensive training, we ought to bring in journalists, particularly,
television journalists. They ought to learn what the Universal Declaration
and the Covenants are. They ought to understand that their reporting of
certain events and their characterization of those as violations will surely
reinforce the norms in question and might act as a deterrent, particularly
when the governments concerned are dependent on or interdependent
with us.
Beyond this, it is important to develop a refined conception of the
range of strategies by which we can direct the reservoir of latent indignation
of public opinion about particular human rights malefactions. It is useful to
think in terms of ideological pressure or pressure using mass communica-
tions; diplomatic pressure or pressure focused directly on those who are in
elite positions: Senators, Congressmen, the President, the Secretary Gen-
eral, and their counterparts abroad; and the economic instrument, such as
boycotts. Nor should one exclude the military instrument. I think coercion
is an inherent part of law and a ubiquitous feature of social process. I
protest all unlawful uses of violence, but see nothing wrong with using
coercion as the last alternative to support and enhance public order. In a
world in which coercion is routinely used, it is quite naive to assume that
one can achieve political goals by forswearing a priori this instrument of
policy.
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V
If we move from the sterile sequence of first importuning our own
government, becoming angry when we are rejected and then blaming the
government, to a more active posture of importuning the government and
when the government cannot respond either for the structural reasons
considered earlier or because of its iniquity or obduracy, to developing our
own strategies, we will discover that we have moved into a different ethical
region. When one protests and asks the government to do something, one
transfers to a government official the awesomely difficult problem of
determining what is the right thing to do in the particular case. The official
must act not simply to terminate a particular outrage, but to enhance-in
terms of international human rights-the entire system for which he is
responsible such that it is no worse off after his action than it was before.
When we act rather than simply demand that someone else act, we too must
take the same broad and consequential perspective. No human rights
activist any more than any sensible government official can take pride in a
human rights intervention in any of the modes of influence I have
reviewed, which leaves the situation after the intervention net worse off in
terms of human rights than it was before.
What do we really want when we encounter a cancerous social
situation in which there is a serious rights violation? It is not enough to
terminate or stop one particular practice. We want to make sure that the
situation after intervention-after pulling one strand out of a complex
social fabric-is better in terms of all the human values we cherish. Hence
we must ask ourselves in a systematic fashion what is likely to be the result
of intervention in terms of the shaping and sharing of power, in terms of
the production and distribution of wealth, in terms of the freedom of
cultivation of enlightenment and skill, in terms of the freedom of cultiva-
tion of religion, in terms of the freedom to pursue sexual and agapeic love,
in terms of the health of the community, in terms of individual and group
respect, and so on. There are circumstances that are so comprehensively
evil that only a complete revolution may make sense. In other situations,
sober appraisal may suggest that pressure for organic and incremental
rather than radical change may be more appropriate. A single strategy must
be evaluated prospectively, not in terms of its consequences for one clause
of one article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but in terms
of its consequences for all of them.
In thinking in terms of aggregate rather than specific consequences,
we ought to be mindful of a warning Martin Buber sounded to his own
students about the dangers of imagining that they could mechanically apply
a single rule, or a single nostrum, to a situation and make it right. Buber
said:
[T]here are all sorts of similarities in different situations; one can
construct types of situations, one can always find to what section
the particular situation belongs, and draw what is appropriate
from the hoard of established maxims and habits, apply the
appropriate maxim, bring into operation the appropriate habit.
But what is untypical in the particular situation remains unnoticed
and unanswered . . . . In spite of all similarities every living
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situation has, like a new-born child, a new face, that has never
been before and will never come again .... It demands nothing
of what is past. It demands presence, responsibility; it demands
you.5
5. M. BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 113-14 (R.G. Smith trans. 1968).
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